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Removal, Suspension or Demotion
of A Municipal Police Officer:
A Review and Analysis
By JOHN B. MANCKE*
I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, the power to appoint a police officer included
the unlimited power to remove, suspend, or demote the officer.' A
municipality could discipline a police officer without assigning rea-
sons or holding a hearing.2 In order to protect a police officer from
unwarranted discharges, suspensions, or demotions, the Pennsyl-
vania legislature passed statutes applicable to lawfully appointed
police officers.3  The purpose of the legislation was to insure con-
tinued employment of an officer during good behavior and to
prevent unwarranted attacks on the officer.
4
* B.A., Moravian College (1966); J.D., Dickinson School of Law
(1969); Partner, Mancke & Lightman, Harrisburg Pa.
1. See McCandless Township v. Wyle, 375 Pa. 378, 100 A.2d 590
(1953); Petras v. Union Township 23 Pa. D. & C.2d 687 (C.P. Wash. 1962),
aff'd, 409 Pa. 416, 187 A.2d 171 (1963).
2. E.g., Schmeck v. Muhlenberg Township, 44 Berks L.J. 185 (Pa. C.P.
1953).
3. E.g., Pa. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 12638 (1957) (lst class city); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23537 (Supp. 1974) (2d class city); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 30471 (1957) (2nd class-A city); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39408
(1957) (3rd class city); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46190 (Supp. 1974)
(borough); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55644 (1957) (1st class township); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 811 (1974) (Police Tenure Act).
4. Boyle v. Philadelphia, 338 Pa. 129, 12 A.2d 43 (1940); Petras v. Union




The statutes which have been enacted provide civil service or
job tenure protection for the police officer. 5 The provisions of the
legislation apply only to an officer appointed in compliance with
law' and an improperly appointed officer7 or an officer on proba-
tionary status8 gains no civil service or job tenure status. The legis-
lation does not protect either an employee who performs non-police
functions within a police department 9 or a part-time police officer
unless the officer is on call at all times and performs the normal
duties of an officer. 10 An officer who resigns his position is likewise
entitled to none of the benefits of civil service or job tenure status."
The purpose of this article is to summarize and evaluate the
procedures involved in the dismissal, suspension, or demotion of a
Pennsylvania municipal police officer. 12 The statutes are not uni-
form and differ depending primarily upon the type of municipality
involved. An initial review, therefore, of the disciplinary proce-
dures within the types of municipalities is fundamental to this
article.
5. Petras v. Union Township, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 687 (C.P. Wash. 1962),
aff'd, 409 Pa. 416, 187 A.2d 171 (1963).
6. E.g., In re Templeton, 399 Pa. 10, 159 A.2d 725 (1960); Manning
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 387 Pa. 176, 127 A.2d 599 (1957); Detoro v. Pitts-
ton, 351 Pa. 178, 40 A.2d 486 (1945); Ragnoli v. Civil Service Comm'n, 3
Pa. D. & C.2d 492 (C.P. Bucks 1955); Appeal of Duffy, 53 Lack. Jur. 117
(Pa. C.P. 1952).
7. E.g., Snizaski v. Zaleski, 410 Pa. 548, 189 A.2d 284 (1963); Manning
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 387 Pa. 176, 127 A.2d 599 (1957). See Shady v.
Wyoming, 78 Pa. D & C. 584 (C.P. Luz. 1952).
8. E.g., Matz v. Clairton City, 340 Pa. 98, 16 A.2d 300 (1940); Salkeld
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 6 Pa. D & C 535 (C.P. Del. 1936). See Civil
Service Comm'n v. Walsh, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 26, 315 A.2d 326
(1974). But see Hunter v. Jones 417 Pa. 372, 207 A.2d 784 (1965) (alleging
discrimination).
9. E.g., Burggraf v. Shields, 332 Pa. 165, 2 A.2d 724 (1938); McNitt
v. Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 503, 158 A. 150 (1931). But cf. Voda v. Exeter, 74
Pa. D. & C. 137 (C.P. Luz. 1951).
10. See Deskins v. West Brownsville, 388 Pa. 547, 131 A.2d 101 (1957);
Yatzor v. Showman, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 291, 290 A.2d 425 (1972);
Masemer v. McSherrystown, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 669 (C.P. Adams 1965); Droz
v. Brownstown Borough, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 205 (C.P. Cambria 1967); Petras
v. Union Township, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 687 (C.P. Wash. 1962), affd, 409 Pa.
416, 187 A.2d 171 (1963).
11. Cf. Spaulding v. Bd. of Supervisors, 22 Cumb. L.J. 56 (Pa. C.P.
1972). But see Palmatier v. Phillips, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 474 (C.P. Chest.
1963).
12. For some recent cases involving removals or demotions of Pennsyl-
vania state police officers see McCann v. Pennsylvania, - Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. -, 330 A.2d 573 (1975); Graci v. Pennsylvania State Police, -
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 324 A.2d 887 (1974); Merlino v. Commonwealth,
12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 412, 315 A.2d 886 (1974); McCann v. Barger, 11
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 517, 314 A.2d 35 (1974); Dussia v. Barger, 10 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 167, 309 A.2d 607 (1973).
II. STATUTORY PROCEDURES
A. First Class City
Philadelphia has adopted Home Rule Charter provisions con-
cerning the civil service rights of police officers which obviate the
provisions of the First Class City Code in Philadelphia." A review
of the Code, however, provides a background for a discussion of
the Home Rule Charter provisions. The First Class City Code gives
civil service status to police officers and no police officer may be
disciplined without proof of "just cause."'1 4 The Code does not de-
lineate what constitutes "just cause" and the civil service commis-
sion is given wide discretion in making the determination.15 The
Code provides that charges must be filed and a hearing must be
held before final action can be taken.16 The charges may be filed
by any citizen or a superior officer. 7 Under earlier Code provi-
sions, a panel of police officers would determine the merits of the
charges.' Under the present Code provisions, the civil service
commission investigates and makes a determination on the merits
after a public hearing.19 The commission then certifies the decision
to the appointing authority.
20
The First Class City Code permits the suspension of an officer
by a superior for any reasonable period not exceeding thirty days.21
The suspension is without pay but the civil service commission
is given the power to investigate the suspension to determine its
validity. If the commission disapproves a suspension, the commis-
sion has the power to restore pay to the suspended officer. A sus-
pension may be a preliminary step toward removal on charges filed
or it may be the sole punishment issued by a superior.22 The civil
service commission may also modify its former order discharging
the officer and reduce the order to suspension.23 The legislation
is silent on demotions and reductions in rank. In the early deci-
sions, the courts held that an officer could be demoted without any
reference to the civil service procedures. 24 The courts have revers-
13. PA. CODE tit. 351, § 7.7-200 (1974). See Stanton v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 543, 275 A.2d 716 (1971).
14. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 53, § 12638 (1957).
15. Souder v. Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 A. 245 (1931).
16. PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 53, § 12638 (1957).
17. Id. See Krouse v. Driscoll, 78 Pa. D. & C. 72 (C.P. Phila. 1952).
18. See Casper v. Philadelphia, 55 Pa. Super. 266 (1913).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 12638 (1957).
20. Id.
21. Id.; Haslam v. Philadelphia, 314 Pa. 225, 171 A. 563 (1934); Bolay
v. Philadelphia, 102 Pa. Super. 510, 157 A. 374 (1931); McMonagle v. Phila-
delphia, 15 Pa. D. & C. 772 (C.P. Phila. 1931).
22. O'Brien v. Philadelphia, 113 Pa. Super. 103, 172 A. 187 (1934); Quig
v. Philadelphia, 113 Pa. Super. 102, 172 A. 187 (1934); Egan v. Philadelphia,
113 Pa. Super. 93, 172 A. 183 (1934).
23. Goldberg v. Philadelphia, 3 Pa. D. & C. 19 (C.P. Phila. 1923).
24. McCoach v. Philadelphia, 273 Pa. 317, 117 A. 71 (1922); Osterheldt
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ed their earlier position to provide that, under the Code, an officer
who is demoted is entitled to the same procedural rights as a
discharged officer.
25
The Home Rule Charter provisions, which are presently in
effect in Philadelphia, similarly permit dismissal, suspension, or
demotion for "just cause" only.26 The police commissioner, prior
to disciplining an officer, may employ a police board of inquiry in
an advisory capacity to assist in determining the punishment, but
the commissioner is not obligated to abide by the recommendation
of the board.2 Once an action of dismissal or demotion is taken,
Philadelphia's civil service regulations require that written reasons
must be given ten days prior to the effective date of the disciplinary
action.28 Within ten days of the initial notice of charges, the officer
may reply in writing. 29 Upon the receipt of a reply, the appointing
authority must file another notification of action being taken
against the officer or the charges will lapse.80 A suspended officer
must be given notice of the suspension but the officer is not given
a right to answer the charges.31 No suspension, however, may ex-
ceed thirty days. 2 Any action which results in dismissal, demotion,
or suspension of ten days or more in any one year may be appealed
to the civil service commission. 3 The commission is required to
promptly hold a public hearing to affirm or reject the reasons
assigned for any action taken against an officer.
8 4
B. Second Class City and Second Class City-A
The police civil service provisions applicable to second class
cities are the most complicated of any political subdivision in Penn-
sylvania. 35 The provisions prevent summary dismissals except
v. Philadelphia, 113 Pa. Super. 8, 171 A. 100 (1934); Leary v. Moore, 4 Pa.
D. & C. 25 (C.P. Phila. 1923).
25. Simmler v. Philadelphia, 329 Pa. 197, 198 A. 1 (1938); Menge v.
Philadelphia, 36 Pa. D. & C. 352 (C.P. Phila. 1940). But cf. Petrillo v. Far-
rell, 345 Pa. 518, 29 A.2d 94 (1943) (3rd class city).
26. PA. CODE tit. 351, § 7.7-303 (1974); see DeVito v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 404 Pa. 354, 172 A.2d 161 (1961).
27. See Perry v. Civil Service Comm'n, 403 Pa. 643, 170 A.2d 580
(1961).
28. P1IIA. CIVM SERVICE REG.. 17, § 17.01.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. PHILA. CIVIL SERVICE REG. 17, § 17.04.
32. Id.
33. PA. CODE tit. 351, § 7.7-201 (1974).
34. Id.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23537 (Supp. 1974) (officers of the com-
petitive class); Pittsburgh v. Gildea, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 364, 290 A.2d
878 (1972).
where the officer has been convicted of a felony. In all other cases,
no officer may be removed, discharged, or suspended for a period
of more than ten days or reduced in rank except for enumerated
reasons.3 6 Charges are required to be filed outlining the reasons
for disciplinary action.3 7 A hearing must be held within ten days
of the filing of charges and the director of public safety may sus-
pend an employee until a hearing is held.
In determining whether a removal, suspension for more than
ten days, or demotion is proper, a police trial or inquiry court must
be convened unless waived by the officer.38 A trial or inquiry court
may also be held if an officer who is suspended for less than ten
days requests it. 9 The court is comprised of fellow officers of equal
or superior rank and the act provides for an elaborate, impartial
selection process of the members of the three-member court.40 The
officer involved has the right to be heard before the court and pre-
sent a defense to the charges. If the charges involve neglect or
violation of law or duty, inefficiency, intemperance, disobedience
of orders, or unbecoming official or personal conduct, the court is
conducted as a trial court which may authorize imposition of a fine,
pay stoppage, dismissal, or suspension not exceeding one year.
41
Once the decision of the trial court of inquiry has been made,
it must be certified in writing to the mayor.42 If the mayor rejects
the findings or decision, the police court's decision is not binding.43
Upon rejection by the mayor, a second trial court or inquiry should
be convened immediately. 44 If the mayor again rejects the decision,
subsequent police court hearings must be held until the mayor
approves the board's decision. Upon approval of the mayor, the
accused officer has the right to appeal to the civil service commis-
sion.45 The commission may permit the taking of additional
testimony.46 The civil service commission may affirm, modify, or
revoke the decision of the court of trial or inquiry.47 The decision
36. Although the statute refers to removal for "just cause," it provides
specific reasons for charges which include disability for service; neglect or
violation of law or duty; inefficiency, intemperance, disobedience of orders;
or unbecoming official or personal conduct. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23537
(Supp. 1974).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23537 (Supp. 1974).
38. Id.; Pittsburgh v. Gildea, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 364, 290 A.2d
878 (1972); Redman v. Craig, 38 D. & C.2d 462 (C.P. Allegheny 1965).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23537 (Supp. 1974).
40. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23537 (Supp. 1974).
41. See Pittsburgh v. Gildea, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 364, 290 A.2d
878 (1972); Morrone v. Barr, 112 P.L.J. 95 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23538 (1957).
43. Pittsburgh v. Gildea, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 364, 290 A.2d 878
(1972).
44. Fairbanks v. Pittsburgh, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 328 A.2d 533
(1974).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23538 (1957).
46. Id. Earlier provisions did not permit the taking of additional testi-
mony. See Slessinger v. Fairley, 340 Pa. 273, 16 A.2d 710 (1941).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23538 (1957).
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of the civil service commission can be appealed to the county court
and the court is given the authority to hear the case de novo.
48
The process provides four levels of review of any action taken
against a police officer and substantial modification or complete re-
jection of findings may be made at each level. This is unnecessarily
cumbersome and time consuming.
The second class city-A procedures are similar but less compli-
cated than the second class city provisions. The second class city-
A provisions provide for specified charges to be filed and a court
of inquiry or a trial court to be convened. 49 The court consists
of fellow officers of equal or superior rank to determine the validity
of the charges. While the charges are similar to those which will
result in the disciplining of a second class city officer, special sus-
pension provisions apply to those officers in a second class city-
A which are charged with intoxication while on duty.5
The selection of the members of the police court to hear the
charges is not as involved as the second class city procedure, 51 but
approval by the mayor of any decision of the trial or inquiry court
is required as in the second class city procedure.5 2 Suspensions may
be issued by the director of public safety against an officer who
has been charged prior to his trial.5 The trial must be held, how-
ever, within one month after the charge has been made.5 4 As in
the Second Class City Code provisions, the necessity of approval
by the mayor may result in a failure to complete the disciplinary
action against an officer.
C. Third Class Cities
The Third Class City Code provides a relatively uncomplicated
method of dealing with police disciplinary action. Third class city
police officers may be discharged, suspended, or demoted by city
48. Appeal of Stanek, 116 P.L.J. 277 (C.P. Allegheny 1968).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 30471, 30472 (1957). See Lucas v. Scran-
ton, 66 Lack. Jur. 45 (Pa. C.P. 1965); Davis v. Scranton, 59 Pa. D. & C. 383
(C.P. Lack. 1948).
50. Reasons for charges include: disability for service; neglect; viola-
tion of law or duty; inefficiency; intemperance; disobedience of orders; un-
becoming official or personal conduct; or intoxication on duty. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 30472 (1957); Wolkoff v. Owens, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
74, 314 A.2d 545 (1974). The statute permits suspensions rather than dis-
missals in cases of intoxication on duty for first and second offenders.
51. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 30472 (1957) with PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 23537 (Supp. 1974).
52. PA. STAT. ANmN. tit. 53, § 30475 (1957).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 30473 (1957).
54. Id.
council after charges have been filed and a hearing has been held
by the council. 55 If a hearing is held, strict rules of evidence do not
apply.5 The charges which may be filed include misconduct or
violation of state law, city ordinances or department regulations!
7
The director of the department may suspend an officer pending ac-
tion upon charges made against the officer 5s or the director may
suspend an officer for a period of up to ten days without preferring
charges.5 9 Demotions, under the Third Class City Code, are not
subject to review although charges must be filed.60 The courts
have rejected the reasoning applied to first class cities where demo-
tions are subject to review.61 The Commonwealth Court has
recently suggested, however, that demotions may be challenged
within the provisions of the Local Agency Act.
62
Although the Third Class City Code provides a simple proce-
dure, it has some inadequacies. If the city council files or investi-
gates the charges, it is doubtful that council members should sit
as judges of the sufficiency of evidence of the charges. 3 The Code
also permits indiscriminate suspensions for less than ten days with-
out redress. An improper suspension, regardless of the period of
time, should be reviewable by a hearing body upon request of the
officer.
6 4
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39408 (1957); Kramer v. Bethlehem, 5 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 139, 289 A.2d 767 (1972).
56. Bradycamp v. Metzger, 310 Pa. 320, 165 A. 387 (1933).
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39408 (1957); see Kramer v. Bethlehem,
5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 139, 289 A.2d 767 (1972).
58. See Zimmerman v. Lebanon, 320 Pa. 581, 184 A. 652 (1936); Peti-
tion of Brosius, 22 Northumberland L.J. 193 (Pa. C.P. 1950); Hartung v.
Jeanette, 53 West. L.J. 55 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
59. See Briney v. McCloskey, 17 Pa. D. & C. 790 (C.P. Cambria 1932);
Appeal of Jones, 25 Fay. L.J. 71 (Pa. C.P. 1963); Gingrich v. Lebanon, 9
Leb. L.J. 335 (Pa. C.P. 1964). It has also been suggested that a suspension
of less than ten days may not be appealed to the courts, Hartung v. Jean-
ette, 53 West. L.J. 55 (Pa. C.P. 1971); Appeal of Jones, 25 Fay. L.J. 71 (Pa.
C.P. 1963).
60. Zeloyle v. Bettor, 371 Pa. 546, 91 A.2d 901 (1952); Petrillo v. Far-
rell, 345 Pa. 518, 29 A.2d 84 (1942).
61. See Petrillo v. Farrell, 345 Pa. 518, 29 A.2d 84 (1942).
62. Kretzler v. Ohio Township, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 236, 322 A.2d
157 (1974).
63. See Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969); cf.
Schlesinger Appeal, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961); Donnon v. Civil Serv-
ice Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 366, 283 A.2d 92 (1971). But see Van-
dergrift Borough v. Polito, 407 Pa. 286, 180 A.2d 215 (1962); Civil Service
Comm'n v. Joseph, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 298, 320 A.2d 158 (1974); Dus-
sia v. Barger, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 167, 309 A.2d 607 (1973); Appeal
From Dismissal of Harloe, 23 Monroe L.R. 21 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
64. This is especially important since the suspension would be relevant
to action taken in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding. See, e.g., Appeal
of Poerio, 3 D. & C.2d 79 (C.P. Beaver 1956); Petition of Brosius, 22
Northumberland L.J. 193 (Pa. C.P. 1950). Although the Third Class City
Code does not permit a hearing or appeal in suspensions of less than ten
days, the Local Agency Act may permit review. See Kretzler v. Ohio




The Borough Code provides that the Borough Council has the
authority to remove, suspend, or demote borough policemen.6 5 In
addition, the mayor may suspend an officer until the succeeding
regular meeting of the council.6 6 At the council meeting, council
must act upon the charges causing the suspension and may dis-
charge, suspend, or demote the officer.6 7 Any attempts by a mayor
to impose a suspension lasting longer than time of the succeeding
council meeting is void.6 8 In boroughs which have three or more
regular policemen, the Borough Code provides the procedure for
the removal, suspension and demotion of police officers.6 9 Bor-
oughs employing less than three regular officers must follow the
mandates of the Police Tenure Act which is discussed in detail
below.7 0 The remainder of this section applies to those boroughs
employing more than three officers.
A police officer may be disciplined for six enumerated rea-
sons.71 At the time council discharges, suspends, or demotes an
officer, council must file charges and furnish a copy to the officer
within five days.72 The officer, however, does not have to be
questioned or given a hearing before the charges are filed.73 Once
council has determined the charges and given a written statement
to the officer, the officer has a right to a civil service hearing if
he has been discharged, suspended, or demoted.74 The civil service
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46121 (1966).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46124 (1966); Decker v. Phillipsburg,
43 Pa. D. & C.2d 211 (C.P. Centre 1967); Grumblis v. Luzerne, 35 Luz. L.R.
409 (Pa. C.P. 1942); Patrick v. Mount Carmel Borough, 29 Northumberland
L.J. 183 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Laux Appeal, 77 D. & C. 211 (C.P Northumberland
1951).
67. Bell v. Flood, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 423, 303 A.2d 244 (1973).
See Goehring's Appeal, 57 Pa. D. & C. 256 (Beaver 1946); Grumblis v.
Luzerne, 35 Luz. L.R. 409 (Pa. C.P. 1941). If no action is taken by council
at the meeting, the suspension by the mayor expires. Decker v. Phillips-
burg, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 211 (C.P. Centre 1967).
68. See Bell v. Flood, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 423, 303 A.2d 244
(1973).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 46190, 46191 (Supp. 1974).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 811 (1974).
71. The reasons for charges include physical or mental disability; ne-
glect or violation of official duty; violation of any law which provides that
such violation constitutes a misdemeanor or felony; inefficiency, neglect, in-
temperance, immorality, disobedience of orders, or conduct unbecoming an
officer; intoxication on duty; and engaging or participating in the conduct-
ing of any political or election campaigns. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46190
(Supp. 1974).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46190 (Supp. 1974); Cerceo v. Darby, 3
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 174, 281 A.2d 251 (1971).
73. Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46191 (Supp. 1974); Goehring's Appeal,
57 Pa. D. & C. 256 (C.P. Beaver 1946); Wargo v. Franklin Borough Council,
387
commission is required to hold a hearing within a period of ten
days from the filing of the charges 5 and council may suspend an
officer pending the outcome of the commission review. 76 At the
commission hearing, the police officer has an opportunity to present
evidence to assist the commission in making its determination.
77
E. First Class Townships
The township commissioners are given the power of supervision
of the police in a first class township.78 This power includes the
power to discharge, suspend or demote an officer.79 In townships
having more than three regular police officers, the civil service pro-
visions of the First Class Township Code apply.80 The Police
Tenure Act, discussed below, applies to those townships having less
than three regular officers.8'
The civil service provisions of the First Class Township Code
outline six reasons for removal, suspension or demotion. 2 The
township commissioners take the initial action and supply the of-
ficer with a list of charges within five days after they are filed.83
Although the statute is unclear as to when the charges must be
filed, similar provisions have been construed to require the charges
at the same time as the action by the governing body.8 4 This en-
ables the officer to prepare an appeal to the civil service commis-
sion.
The person discharged, suspended or demoted may demand a
hearing before the civil service commission and the officer may file
written answers to any charges against him.8 5 The hearing by the
22 Cambria Rep. 175 (Pa. C.P. 1962). The length of suspension by the gov-
erning body or civil service commission is limited to a period of one year
by statute. One court held that since no statutory limit exists on the court's
power on appeal, the court could impose a longer period of suspension.
Carlisle v. Adams, 12 Cumb. L.J. 53 (Pa. C.P. 1961).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46191 (Supp. 1974).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 53, § 56405 (1957); Banks v. Board of Comm'rs,
7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 393, 298 A.2d 923 (1973).
79. See Banks v. Board of Comm'rs, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 393, 298
A.2d 923 (1973).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55625 (1957).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 811 (1974).
82. The reasons for charges include physical or mental disability; ne-
glect or violation of any official duty; violation of law which provides that
such violation constitutes a misdemeanor or felony; inefficiency, neglect, in-
temperance, disobedience of orders, or conduct unbecoming an officer; in-
toxication on duty; and engaging or participating in the conducting of any
political or election campaign. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55644 (1957); see
Upper Moreland v. Mallon, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 618, 309 A.2d 273
(1973).
83. Upper Moreland Township v. Mallon, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 618,
309 A.2d 273 (1973); Banks v. Board of Township Comm'rs, 7 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 393, 298 A.2d 923 (1973).
84. See Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55645 (Supp. 1974).
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civil service commission must be held within ten days unless con-
tinued for cause. While the charges are pending, the officer may
be suspended by the township commissioners.88 If the civil service
commission suspends an officer, the final suspension may not be
for a period of more than one year.87
F. Police Tenure Act
In boroughs and first class townships having less than three
regular full-time officers and in all second class townships, the
Police Tenure Act controls the discharge, suspension and demotion
of police officers.88 At the time the Police Tenure Act was passed,
the Police Civil Service Act provided protection for boroughs and
first class townships which employed more than three full-time offi-
cers. There was no protection for officers in smaller police forces.
To remedy the inequitable situation, the Police Tenure Act was
passed to extend tenure rights to borough and township police
forces of less than three members. 9 The legislature intended to
establish an equivalent of the civil service removal, suspension, and
demotion procedures for all officers regardless of size of the force
or the political classification of the municipality. 90
Under the Police Tenure Act, the governing body may take ac-
tion against the officer for five specified reasons.91 The Act re-
quires that written charges must be given to the officer within five
days after they are filed. 92 After discharge or suspension, the offi-
cer may request a hearing before the governing body.9 3 If the offi-
86. Fleming Appeal, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 309 (C.P. Del. 1959).
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55645 (Supp. 1974).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 811-815 (1974).
89. See McCandless Township v. Wylie, 375 Pa. 378, 100 A.2d 590
(1953); Masemer v. McSherrystown, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 669 (C.P. Adams
1964); Petras v. Union Township, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 687 (C.P. Wash. 1962),
aff'd, 409 Pa. 416, 187 A.2d 171 (1963).
90. George v. Moore, 394 Pa. 419, 147 A.2d 148 (1959). Some munici-
palities attempted to reduce the size of their force to less than three officers
after the civil service provisions were enacted in an effort to avoid the stat-
utory mandates. E.g., Dauber's Case, 151 Pa. Super. 293, 30 A.2d 214
(1942).
91. The reasons for charges include physical or mental disability; ne-
gelct or violation of any official duty; violating any law which provides that
such violation constitutes a misdemeanor or felony; inefficiency, neglect, in-
temperance, disobedience of orders, or conduct unbecoming an officer; and
intoxication on duty. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 812 (1974); Soergel v. Bd.
of Supervisors, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 311, 316 A.2d 89 (1974).
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 812 (1974). See Petras v. Union Town-
ship, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 687 (C.P. Wash. 1962), aff d, 409 Pa. 416, 187 A.2d
171 (1963).
93. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 53, § 812 (1974).
cer has only been demoted, he has no right to a hearing under
the Act. 4 The commonwealth court has recently suggested, how-
ever, that the Local Agency Act permits a hearing and appeal upon
demotion."'
Although the failure to give written charges to the officer ren-
ders a discharge or suspension null and void,96 the Police Tenure
Act does not suggest who must initiate the charges or when the
charges must be filed. In cases involving similar language regard-
ing a borough police force with more than three officers, the
supreme court held the charges must be filed by council at the
time the council takes action against the officer.97 If a similar con-
struction is placed on the Police Tenure Act, the charges would
be formulated by the governing body and would be heard by the
same body. This procedure would contradict the supreme court's
directive that a man cannot sit as judge when he is a member of
a board which has brought the accusations.9" While the purpose
of the Police Tenure Act in providing for written charges and a
hearing before discharge or suspension is proper, the Act is cer-
tainly subject to due process criticism if the governing body which
takes action against the officer is also the body which holds a hear-
ing to determine the sufficiency of the charges.
HI. SUFFICIENCY OF REASONS AND ADEQUACY OF PROOF
The statutes referred to generally indicate the charges sufficient
to support a suspension, removal or demotion of a police officer.
At any hearing, the burden is on the municipality to present clear,
convincing, and substantial evidence to support the charges filed
against the officerY"9 The burden is also on the municipality to
establish that proven charges are sufficient to warrant the disci-
94. Rossiter v. Whitpain Township, 404 Pa. 201, 170 A.2d 586 (1961).
But see Kline v. Hampton Township, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 49 (C.P. Allegheny
1967).
95. Kretzer v. Ohio Township, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 236, 322 A.2d
157 (1974).
96. Clark v. Bd. of Supervisors, 19 Chest. Rep. 161 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
97. Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969).
98'. See Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969); cf.
Schlesinger Appeal, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961); Donnon v. Civil Serv-
ice Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 366, 283 A.2d 92 (1971); Ham Appeal,
65 Pa. D. & C. 2d 415 (C.P. Chest. 1974). But see Vandergrift Borough v.
Polito, 407 Pa. 286, 180 A.2d 215 (1962); Civil Service Comm'n v. Joseph,
13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 298, 320 A.2d 158 (1974); Dussia v. Barger, 10
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 167, 309 A.2d 607 (1973); Appeal From Dismissal
of Harloe, 23 Monroe L.R. 21 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
99. Gallagher v. Civil Service Comm'n, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -,
330 A.2d 287 (1974); Soergel v. Bd. of Supervisors, 12 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 311, 316 A.2d 89 (1974); Karmer v. Bethlehem, 5 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 139, 289 A.2d 767 (1972); Ellison v. Civil Service Comm'n, 5 Bucks L.R.
70 (Pa. C.P. 1956); Dougherty v. Civil Service Comm'n, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d
115 (C.P. Chest. 1965); Hritz v. Civil Service Comm'n, 17 Chest. Rep. 48




pline imposed. 00 The proof of misconduct, however, does not have
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt' 0 ' and even though an offi-
cer is acquitted of criminal charges arising out of the conduct re-
ferred to, an acquittal of criminal charges is not controlling.
10 2
While most of the statutes involving discipline of police officers
contain specific charges which may support the discipline imposed,
the First Class City Code and the present Philadelphia Home Rule
provisions do not delineate charges. Both provide for discipline for
"just cause" without any guidelines as to what constitutes cause
for discipline.10 3 The absence of guidelines has been justly criti-
cized as a violation of due process. 0 4 The reasons or charges in
the other statutes usually number five or six but they may, for
the purpose of discussion, be divided into three general categories.
The first category includes discipline for physical or mental dis-
ability, the second involves discipline for conduct unbecoming an
officer, and the third involves discipline for neglect or violation of
official duty or law.
A. Physical or Mental Disability
There has been little litigation concerning removal, suspension,
or demotion of an officer for physical or mental disability. In those
municipalities where a police court determines the charges of physi-
cal or mental disability, the police court is held as a court of inquiry
rather than a trial court. 0 5 If the officer is removed, he receives
an honorable discharge. In a recent decision, the commonwealth
court upheld a municipal ordinance requiring compulsory physical
examinations as a condition precedent to continued employment as
a police officer. 0 6 The effect of this decision on the right of an
100. Schauer Dismissal Case, 401 Pa. 486, 165 A.2d 26 (1960); Soergel
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 311, 316 A.2d 89 (1974);
Masemer v. McSherrystown, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 669 (C.P. Adams 1964);
Mount Holly Springs v. Stoerzinger, 12 Cumb. L.J. 2 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
101. Zeber Appeal, 393 Pa. 35, 156 A.2d 821 (1959); Shannon v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 492, 287 A.2d 858 (1972).
102. Kramer v. Bethlehem, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 139, 289 A.2d 767
(1972).
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 12638 (1957); PA. CODE tit. 351, § 7.7-303
(1974); see Staton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 543,
275 A.2d 716 (1971).
104. Staton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 543, 275
°A.2d 716 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
105. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53, § 23537 (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 30472 (1957).
106. Sharon v. Rose of Sharon Lodge No. 3, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
277, 315 A.2d 355 (1973). But see Heilman v. Schreiber, 9 Leb. L.J. 344
(Pa. C.P. 1963); Bennis Appeal, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 260 (C.P. Lehigh 1954).
officer to have a hearing on the issue of disability was not consi-
dered 'by the court. Ordinances which permit removal for physical
reasons without a hearing seem in direct conflict with those statutes
providing for a hearing on the issue of physical disability.
B. Conduct Unbecoming An Officer
Conduct unbecoming an officer or misconduct is one of the most
litigated causes of discipline. The phrase "conduct unbecoming an
officer" has been defined as any conduct which adversely affects
the morale or efficiency of the police force and also any conduct
which has a tendency to destroy public respect for the police force
and confidence in the operation of the force.4 7 By definition, the
conduct generally deals with the officer's conduct in public. While
each case depends on its individual facts, several generalizations can
be drawn from the decisions involving unbecoming conduct. The
conduct involved does not have to be performed while the officer
is on duty, 08 and it is not necessary that the alleged conduct be
criminal in character.10 9 Improper involvement with women," 0
use of vile language in public,"' excessive drinking or drinking on
duty,11 2 involvement with criminal activites or figures, 11 or public
altercations'1 4 are examples of the type of conduct which has al-
107. E.g., Zeber Appeal, 398 Pa. 35, 156 A.2d 821 (1959); Albano v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 333, 320 A.2d 385 (1974);
Kramer v. Bethlehem, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 139, 289 A.2d 767 (1972).
108. Carlisle v. Adams, 12 Cumb. L.J. 53 (Pa. C.P. 1962); see Caldwell
v. Fairley, 363 Pa. 213, 69 A.2d 135 (1949); Staton v. Civil Service Comm'n,
1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 543, 275 A.2d 716 (1971).
109. Zeber Appeal, 398 Pa. 35, 156 A.2d 821 (1959); Banks v. Board of
Comm'rs, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 393, 298 A.2d 923 (1973). But see Hritz
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 17 Chest. Rep. 4' (Pa. C.P. 1968).
110. E.g., New Kensington v. Swierczewski, 397 Pa- 559, 156 A.2d 181
(1959); Zimmerman v. Lebanon, 320 Pa. 581, 184 A. 652 (1936); Kramer
v. Bethlehem, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 139, 289 A.2d 767 (1972); Ditko Ap-
peal, 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 569 (C.P. Berks 1955), affd, 385 Pa. 435, 123 A.2d
718 (1956); Appeal From Dismissal of Harloe, 23 Monroe L.R. 21 (Pa. C.P.
1960). But see Vega Appeal, 383 Pa. 44, 117 A.2d 736 (1955) (evidence suf-
ficient for suspension only).
111. E.g., Norris v. Pottstown Borough Council, 85 Montg. L. Rep. 346
(Pa. C.P. 1966); Appeal of Oresconin, 43 Mum 114 (C.P. Beaver 1951).
112. E.g., Gabaver v. Civil Service Comm'n, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
646, 297 A.2d 507 (1972); Carlisle v. Adams, 12 Cumb. L.J. 53 (Pa. C.P.
1961). Most statutes also maintain intoxication on the job as a separate
reason for discipline. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 30472 (1957); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 46190 (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55644 (1957);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 812 (1974).
113. Appeal of Baker, 409 Pa. 143, 185 A.2d 521 (1962); Souder v. Phila-
delphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 A. 245 (1931); Pawling v. Reading, 62 Berks L.J.
56 (1969); Millcreek Township Supervisors v. Vogt, 55 Erie L.J. 11 (Pa. C.P.
1972); Appeal of Rash, 74 Pa. D. & C. 587 (C.P. Lack. 1951). But see Gart-
land v. Philadelphia, 70 Pa. D. & C. 161 (C.P. Phila. 1950).
114. Albano v. Civil Service Comm'n, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 333, 320
A.2d 385 (1974); Staton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
543, 275 A.2d 716 (1971); Betters Appeal, 65 Pa. D. & C. 363 (C.P. Beaver
1949); Appeal of Nye, 53 Berks L.J. 67 (Pa. C.P. 1968); Norris v. Pottstown
Municipal Police Officer
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
most always resulted in valid disciplinary action against a police
officer.
C. Violation Of Statute Or Ordinance
Violations of statutes or ordinances are also statutory grounds
for disciplinary action in most municipalities.115 Violations of sta-
tutes or ordinances usually result in the removal of the officer
because of the seriousness of the charge. The civil service commis-
sion or governing body at the hearing determines the charges
independent of any criminal actions against the officer. Neither
a conviction nor acquittal of criminal charges is binding on the
hearing body.116 The courts have permitted the punishment of an
officer who fails to obey proper regulations, follow good police pro-
cedures or duty orders of the governing body or a superior
officer. 1 7 In one recent decision, the commonwealth court upheld
disciplinary action against an officer who was following the direc-
tives of the mayor rather than council in the performance of his
duties. 18 However, where the conduct of the officer amounts only
to an oversight rather than willful defiance of an order, no discipli-
nary action should be taken or an officer's punishment should be
slight.119
D. Abolition of Office or Retirement of Officer
Municipalities occasionally attempt to circumvent the provi-
sions of the statutes by abolishing the officer's 20 position or by
Borough Council, 85 Montg. L. Rep. 346 (Pa. C.P. 1965). But see Shannon
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 492, 287 A.2d 858 (1972).
115. E.g., Appeal of Stanek, 116 P.L.J. 277 (Pa. C.P. 1968); Appeal of
Colonna, 26 Beaver L.J. 106 (Pa. C.P. 1964); Gigliard Appeal, 24 Beaver
L.J. 32 (Pa. C.P. 1962); Appeal of Poerio, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 79 (C.P. Beaver
1955); Dougherty v. Civil Service Comm'n, 11 Chest. Rep. 33 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
116. Kramer v. Bethlehem, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 139, 289 A.2d 767
(1972); Redman v. Craig, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 462 (C.P. Allegheny 1965).
117. Albano v. Civil Service Comm'n, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 333, 320
A.2d 385 (1974); Soergel v. Bd. of Supervisors, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
311, 316 A.2d 89 (1974).
118. Albano v. Civil Service Comm'n, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 333, 320
A.2d 385 (1974); cf. Salopek v. Alberts, 417 Pa. 592, 209 A.2d 295 (1965).
119. See Lower Merion Township v. Turkelson, 396 Pa. 374, 152 A.2d
724 (1958); Appeal of Fleming, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 309 (C.P. Del. 1959); Cum-
mings Appeal, 14 Leb. L.J. 95 (Pa. C.P. 1972); Hood Appeal, 78 Pa. D. & C.
318 (C.P. Luz. 1951). See also Smeal v. Civil Service Comm'n, 19 Chest.
Rep. 69 (Pa. C.P. 1971). This is especially true if the officer has a good prior
service record. Mellott's Appeal, 10 Cumb. L.J. 115 (Pa. C.P. 1960).
120. Appeal of Homer, 404 Pa. 184, 170 A.2d 848 (1961); Scaccia v. Old
Forge, 373 Pa. 161, 94 A.2d 563 (1953).
retiring the officer.1 1 While the abolition of a job position for effi-
ciency or economic reasons122 or the retirement of an officer 123 has
been generally permitted, courts carefully scrutinize the facts to
determine whether the action by the governing body is bona fide.
Where an officer's position is abolished but immediately recreated
under a different name after the officer is dismissed, courts have
ordered reinstatement of the discharged officer. 124 Similarly, offi-
cers who have been the victims of discriminatory retirement
ordinances or policies have also been reinstated.
125
IV. COURT PROCEDURES
A. Statutory Appeal to the County Courts
The statutes which define the procedures for discharge, sus-
pension and demotion also permit timely appeals to the court of
common pleas after a hearing on the charges is held by either the
Civil Service Commission or the governing body.' 26 While the Civil
121. Soltis Appeal, 390 Pa. 416, 135 A.2d 744 (1957); Bruich v. Am-
bridge, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 683 (C.P. Beaver 1974); Kime v. Scranton,
43 Lack. Jur. 165 (Pa. C.P. 1942). See also Allen v. West Mifflin, 419 Pa.
394, 214 A.2d 502 (1965).
122. Mamalis v. Civil Service Comr'n, 401 Pa. 375, 164 A.2d 209 (1960);
Boyle v. Philadelphia, 338 Pa. 129, 12 A.2d 43 (1940); Leary v. Philadelphia,
314 Pa. 458, 172 A. 459 (1934); Wolf v. Tominac, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
209, 315 A.2d 314 (1973). See Rescinito v. Breen, 15 Cambria Rep. 1 (Pa.
C.P. 1952). Although council may lay off employees, the mayor does not
have similar power. Marino v. Duquesne, 118 P.L.J. 240 (C.P. Allegheny
1940). In Wolkoff v. Owens, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 74, 314 A.2d 545
(1974), the court held that if no statutory right exists to remove an officer
for economic reasons, removal is improper. Statutory provisions have been
enacted in most types of municipalities to regulate removal for economic
reasons. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23539 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 39408 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55644 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 46190 (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 813 (1974).
123. Soltis Appeal, 390 Pa. 416, 135 A.2d 744 (1957); Boyle v. Philadel-
phia, 338 Pa. 129, 12 A.2d 43 (1940).
124. Appeal of Homer, 404 Pa. 184, 170 A.2d 848 (1961); Schearer v.
Reading, 346 Pa. 27, 28 A.2d 790 (1942); Shegan v. McKeesport, 99 P.L.J.
205 (C.P. Allegheny 1951). But see Toth v. Kostello, 48 West L.J. 293 (Pa.
C.P. 1966), appeal quashed, 425 Pa. 278, 228 A.2d 404 (1967) (entire force
abolished).
125. See Allen v. West Mifflin, 419 Pa. 394, 214 A.2d 502 (1965); Bruich
v. Ambridge, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 683 (C.P. Beaver 1974); Capparell v. Hazel-
ton, 40 Luz. L. Reg. 287 (Pa. C.P. 1949).
126. The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter provides for limited appeals
but the Local Agency Act now controls appeals from the Philadelphia Civil
Service Commission. See Neals v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, -
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 325 A.2d 341 (1974). The statutes controlling
appeals include: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23538 (1957) (2nd class city);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39408 (1957) (3rd class city); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 46191 (Supp. 1974) (borough); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55645 (Supp.
1974) (1st class township); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 815 (1974) (Police Ten-
ure Act). Even in those instances where there is no statutory right to ap-
peal within the police civil service or tenure statutes, the Local Agency Act
permits an appeal of limited scope. See Goetz v. Zelienpole, -Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. -, 324 A.2d 808 (1974); Kretzler v. Ohio Township, 14 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 236, 322 A.2d 157 (1974).
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Service Commission, by statute, may be limited to either affirming
or rejecting the actions of the governing body, the courts usually
'have the authority to affirm, reject or modify any action taken
against an officer.12 7
The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter provides that the decision
of the Civil Service Commission is final and that an appeal to the
courts is limited to jurisdictional or procedural grounds.128 The
Local Agency Act, however, now controls the scope of appeals in
Philadelphia. 129 The Agency Act requires the court to affirm the
commission's action unless it finds that the action was in violation
of the constitutional rights of the appellant, or was not in accord-
ance with law, or was in conflict with the provisions of the Agency
Act, or was not supported by substantial evidence. 30 The Second
Class City Code' 3' and the Third Class City Code18 2 provide that
the appeal should be heard "de novo" by the trial court while the
Borough Code18 3 and the First Class Township Code' 34 suggest that
the court must review the record, take additional testimony if re-
quested, and decide the case "as the court deems proper." The
Police Tenure Act is silent on the type of review,'3 5 but the courts
have held that the hearing may be de novo 36 or decided as the
court deems proper.' 37 In those instances where an officer is de-
moted or no specific statutory appeal rights exist, the Local Agency
Act has been construed as permitting an appeal within the limited
scope referred to above.'3
Although the courts have struggled with defining the scope of
the trial court review,13 9 they apparently agree that there is no
127. Banks v. Board of Conun'rs, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 393, 298 A.2d
923 (1973).
128. DeVito v. Civil Service Comm'n, 404 Pa. 354, 172 A.2d 161 (1961);
Staton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 543, 275 A.2d 716
(1971).
129. Gallagher v. Civil Service Comm'n, - Pa. Commonwealth -, 330
A2d 287 (1974); Harrington v. Civil Service Comm'n, 4 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 580, 287 A.2d 912 (1972).
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11308(b) (1974).
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23538 (1957).
132. PA. STAT. ANm. tit. 53, § 39408 (1957); Nye Appeal, 53 Berks L.J.
67 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46191 (Supp. 1974).
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55645 (Supp. 1974).
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 815 (1974).
136. Mount Holly Springs v. Stoerzinger, 12 Cumb. L.J. 2 (Pa. C.P.
1961).
137. Vega Appeal, 383 Pa. 44, 117 A.2d 736 (1955); cf. Appeal of Cum-
mings, 14 Leb. L.J. 95 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
138. Goetz v. Zelienpole, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 324 A.2d 808
(1974); Kretzler v. Ohio Township, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 236, 322
A.2d 157 (1974).
139. Compare Lower Merion Township v. Turkelson, 396 Pa. 374, 152
real difference between the review under a "de novo" appeal or
a case decided "as the court deems proper."' 40 Some of the deci-
sions properly suggest that the trial courts have liberal power to
make an independent determination of the controversy irrespective
of what the municipal hearing authorities have decided.141 Other
decisions have held that the power of the lower court is restricted
to determining whether just cause for the discipline exists or
whether the municipal authorities have abused their discretion in
making the decison. 142 These decisions have stated that the lower
courts do not have absolute discretion in judging the merits and
validity of the Civil Service Commission's order. 43 An example of
the contrast between the liberal view that the lower court has full
discretion to decide the issue and the stricter interpretation that
the court is limited to determining abuse is obvious in the wording
of two recent commonwealth court decisions. In one case, the
commonwealth court suggested that the lower court had full dis-
cretion in determining its own findings and making its own deter-
mination. The court stated in Township of Upper Moreland v.
Mallon:1
44
In challenging the validity of the lower court's reversal,
Appellant argues initially that the Court of Common Pleas
misconstrued its scope of review in determining that it had
full discretion to make its own findings after it examined
the record made before the Civil Service Commission ....
Appellant has erroneously applied that rule of law to the
present factual setting.
Appellant argues that since no additional testimony was
taken by the Court of Common Pleas, it is an 'appellate
court' and limited in its review to whether the Commission
abused its discretion or committed an error of law. It is
clear, however, that the introduction of additional tes-
timony in the Court of Common Pleas is within the dis-
A.2d 724 (1959); Vega Appeal, 383 Pa. 14, 117 A.2d 736 (1955); Upper More-
land v. Mallon, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 618, 309 A.2d 273 (1973); Reabe's
Appeal, 59 Pa. D. & C. 586 (C.P. Allegheny 1947); Smeal v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 19 Chest. Rep. 69 (Pa. C.P. 1971) with Baker Case, 409 Pa. 143,
185 A.2d 521 (1962); Bell Appeal, 396 Pa. 592, 152 A.2d 731 (1959); Ga-
bauer v. Civil Service Comm'n, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 646 (1972); Ditko
Appeal, 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 569 (C.P. Berks 1955), af 'd, 385 Pa. 435, 123 A.2d
718 (1956); Pawling v. Reading, 62 Berks L.J. 56 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
140. See Gabauer v. Civil Service Comm'n, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
646, 297 A.2d 507 (1972).
141. Lower Merion Township v. Turkelson, 396 Pa. 374, 152 A.2d 724
(1959); Vega Appeal, 383 Pa. 44, 117 A.2d 736 (1955); Reabe's Appeal, 59
Pa. D. & C. 586 (C.P. Allegheny 1947).
142. Baker Case, 409 Pa. 143, 185 A.2d 521 (1962); Ditko Appeal, 5 Pa.
D. & C.2d 569 (C.P. Berks 1955), affd, 385 Pa. 435, 123 A.2d 718 (1956);
Dougherty v. Civil Service Comm'n, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 115 (C.P. Chest. 1964).
143. Baker Case, 409 Pa. 143, 185 A.2d 521 (1962); Bell Appeal, 396 Pa.
592, 158 A.2d 731 (1959); Pawling v. Reading, 62 Berks L.J. 56 (Pa. C.P.
1969).
144. 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 618, 309 A.2d 273 (1973). See also Stoer-
zinger v. Mount Holly Springs, 12 Cumb. L.J. 2 (Pa. C.P. 1961).
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cretion of the parties and their tactical judgment does not
affect the court's power to determine the case 'as the court
deems proper.' (53 P.S. § 55645). The statute gives the Court
of Common Pleas discretion to affirm, reverse or modify
the action of the Civil Service Commission. Lower Merion
Township v. Turkelson, 396 Pa. 374, 152 A.2d 724 (1959).144a
In another decision,145 the same court ruled the function of the trial
court was merely to determine whether the municipal officials have
abused their discretion in disciplining the municipal officers and
stated:
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Baker Case, 409 Pa.
143 at page 147, 185 A.2d 521 at page 523 (1962), discussed
the function of the trial court on appeal from a decision
of the Civil Service Commission of the City of Pittsburgh
as follows:
'Under the scheme established by the civil service acts,
primary responsibility and decision as to the methods
necessary to uphold police morale and efficiency and to
maintain public confidence in the police department resides
in the municipal officials. See Caldwell v. Fairley, 363 Pa.
213, 69 A.2d 135 (1949) and Thomas v. Connell, 264 Pa. 242,
107 A. 691 (1919). The function of the courts is merely to
make sure that just cause for dismissal exists, both fac-
tually and legally, and that the municipal officials have not
abused their discretion in imposing the punishment in
question. It is not our function to decide what we would
have done under the circumstances if we had been Baker's
superiors.'
Also see Ditko Appeal, 5 Pa. Dist. & Co. R.2d 569 (1955),
affirmed per curiam 385 Pa. 435, 123 A.2d 718 (1956).
The test announced in Baker, supra, also is applicable to
an appeal under the Borough Code. Norris v. Pottstown
Borough Council, 85 Mont. Co. L. Reporter 346 (1965);
Dougherty v. Civil Service Commission of Borough of
Phoenixville, 35 Pa. Dist. & Co. R.2d 115 (1964).145a
The confusion is apparently caused by a failure of the courts
to recognize the difference in the role of the trial court which is
hearing an appeal from a municipal hearing and the role of the
appellate court which hears appeals from the trial court level. None
of the statutes authorizing appeal limit the scope of review by the
county court and the statutes suggest unlimited review by the
144a. Id. at 622, 309 A.2d at 276.
145. Gabauer v. Civil Service Comm'n, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 646,
297 A.2d 507 (1972).
145a. Id. at 649, 297 A.2d at 509. See also Pawling v. Reading, 62 Berks
L.J. 56 (Pa. C.P. 1969); Appeal of Smith, 42 Del. Rep. 189 (Pa. C.P. 1955);
Thomas v. Peters Township, 46 Wash. Rep. 35 (Pa. C.P. 1965); Spinelli v.
New Kensington, 33 West. L.J. 49 (Pa. C.P. 1950).
lower-court judge. Although the scope of review of the trial court's
determination on appeal by the appellate courts is not described
statutorily, the recent decisions are in agreement that the appellate
court hears the case on "broad certiorari. 146 The appellate court
must determine that the proceedings were regular and that the
lower court was not guilty of an abuse of discretion or an error
of law.147 If the findings of the trial court are not supported by
evidence, then the appellate court must reverse the lower-court's
decision.
While it seems that appellate review beyond the county-court
level should be limited to a review of matters of abuse by the
county court on the facts in the record, no such limitation can be
placed on the trial court which has statutory power to make its
own independent determination either on the record before it or
on the basis of additional testimony. While the lower court may
certainly consider prior local government action on the case, the
legislature has given the trial judge the right to -decide the case
irrespective of what has occurred at the municipal or commission
hearings.
B. Non-Statutory Procedures
While the various civil service or tenure statutes permit an ap-
peal to the courts, other non-statutory remedies have also been per-
mitted to correct improper disciplinary action taken against a police
officer. The courts favor the statutory appeals but have recognized
the right of an officer to bring a mandamus action if the facts war-
rant it. Since mandamus is recognized as an extraordinary writ,
the plaintiff must show a clear legal right, a corresponding duty
on the part of the defendant, and want of any other appropriate
and adequate remedy.
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Mandamus had been used successfully in achieving a review
of disciplinary procedures when the governing body failed to per-
form a ministerial or mandatory duty required by statute. Courts
have ruled favorably on mandamus actions where the governing
body failed to file charges or hold a hearing as required by law.
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146. Vandergrift Borough v. Polito, 407 Pa. 286, 180 A.2d 215 (1962);
New Kensington v. Swierczewski, 397 Pa. 559, 156 A.2d 181 (1959).
147. Bell Appeal, 396 Pa. 592, 152 A.2d 731 (1959); Banks v. Board of
Comm'rs, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 393, 298 A.2d 923 (1973); Kramer v.
Bethlehem, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 139, 289 A.2d 767 (1972); Shannon v.
Civil Service Comm'n, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 492, 287 A.2d 858 (1972).
148. See Gallagher v. Board of Comm'rs, 438 Pa. 280, 264 A.2d 699
(1970); Matz v. Clairton, 340 Pa. 98, 16 A.2d 300 (1940); Civil Service
Comm'n v. Walsh, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 26, 315 A.2d 326 (1974);
Spaulding v. Bd. of Supervisors, 22 Cumb. L.J. 56 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
149. E.g., George v. Moore, 394 Pa. 419, 147 A.2d 148 (1959); Kusza v.
Maximonis, 363 Pa. 479, 70 A.2d 329 (1950); Seltzer v. Reading, 340 Pa. 573,
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If the governing body complied with the statues, however, courts
have not permitted a mandamus action to serve as a substitute for
determining the substantive propriety of the action taken. 50 The
courts -have consistently held that the statutory appeal from the
action of the Civil Service Commission or governing body serves
as an adequate remedy to attack the substantive validity of the
decision.
Occasionally an action in assumpsit has been instituted to seek
wages lost during an improper suspension.' 15 Since improperly lost
wages, less any permitted credits, may be ordered to be paid during
the statutory appeal procedures, 52 assumpsit actions are not fav-
ored. 53 The courts have been reluctant to permit a possible jury
trial in an assumpsit action where the statutes have provided de-
tailed means of determining the propriety of the actions of the
municipality. 54 An action in assumpsit should be used only after
the other remedies have been explored.
V. CONCLUSION
The current statutes, which have been enacted to protect police
officers from improper action by municipal officials, are inadequate
and incomplete. The wide variety of removal, suspension, and
demotion procedures among the types of Pennsylvania municipali-
ties encourages confusion'1 5 and unnecessary litigation. While the
courts have found fault with local officials for misinterpreting the
statutes,156 a more uniform and detailed procedure is needed to eli-
minate the inadequacies of the current laws. The provisions should
clearly indicate what charges may be filed, who may file them, and
when they may be filed. If requested, a hearing by an independent
agency is essential to due process. The hearing should be manda-
segive v. Lewisburg, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 83 (C.P. Union 1962). See Wolkoff v.
Owens, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 74, 314 A.2d 545 (1974).
150. See Slessinger v. Fairley, 340 Pa. 273, 16 A.2d 710 (1940); Brady-
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151. Gray v. McKeesport, 133 Pa. 24, 1 A.2d 834 (1938); Keller v.
Wilkes-Barre, 53 Luz. L. Reg. 184 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
152. See Ellison v. Bristol Township Civil Service Comm'n, 5 Bucks L.J.
70 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
153. Taskey v. Pittsburgh, 123 Pa. Super. 573, 187 A.2d 262 (1936);
Tompkins v. North Cornwall Township, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 291 (C.P. Leb.
1966); Decker v. Phillipsburg, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 211 (C.P. Union 1967).
154. See Hart v. Regener, 21 Chest. Rep. 125 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
155. See Masemer v. McSherrystown, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 669 (C.P. Adams
1964).
156. See Cerceo v. Darby, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 174, 281 A.2d 251
(1974).
tory if the officer is removed, suspended, or demoted. After the
hearing, the police officer should have the right to appeal to the
county court.
The scope of review by the county court of a removal, suspen-
sion or demotion order should be construed consistently. The sta-
tutes, which indicate that a court may review an action de novo
or as it deems proper, suggest that the county courts possess full
discretion to decide the issues on appeal Where the statutes are
silent on the availability or scope of the appeal, the legislature
should provide consistent legislation permitting the county courts
full authority to decide the case as it deems proper.
Local municipalities have often abused the rights of a police
officer and have removed, suspended, or demoted an officer without
due process. To prevent further abuse, the legislature has an obli-
gation to clarify the procedures involved. The courts have a duty
to act promptly5 7 and consistently on appeal. Otherwise, litigation
will continue on questions which could be readily resolved by pro-
perly written statutes and decisions.
157. In one case, over nine years elapsed from the date of the initial
municipal hearing and a decision of the commonwealth court. Kramer v.
Bethlehem, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 139, 289 A.2d 767 (1972).
